refactor(blog): move Tauri capabilities link inline, remove from What's Next

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

Author: rgbkrk

content/blog/security.mdx

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ Part of nteract's security story is the framework we chose to build on.
 
 The original nteract was Electron. Electron bundles Chromium with full Node.js access — every renderer process can `require('child_process')` and run shell commands unless you carefully restrict it. That's a lot of surface area to defend, and a single `nodeIntegration: true` away from disaster.
 
-[Tauri](https://tauri.app/) flips this. The frontend is a native webview with no Node.js. There's no `require`, no `child_process`, no `fs` available to JavaScript by default. The backend is Rust. Every native capability — filesystem access, shell commands, HTTP requests — must be explicitly granted through a capability system. If we don't allowlist it, the frontend can't do it.
+[Tauri](https://tauri.app/) flips this. The frontend is a native webview with no Node.js. There's no `require`, no `child_process`, no `fs` available to JavaScript by default. The backend is Rust. Every native capability — filesystem access, shell commands, HTTP requests — must be explicitly granted through a [capability system](https://github.com/nteract/desktop/issues/908). If we don't allowlist it, the frontend can't do it.
 
 This matters for notebooks because the webview is where untrusted outputs render. In Electron, a sandbox escape in an output iframe could reach Node.js APIs. In Tauri, even if an iframe somehow escaped its sandbox, there's nothing on the other side — no runtime to hijack, no implicit native access. The webview is a dead end by design.
 
@@ -115,6 +115,6 @@ None of these are revolutionary ideas individually. But notebooks have operated
 * [Secret redaction](https://github.com/nteract/desktop/issues/1557): if your code accidentally prints an API key, nteract catches it at the daemon and redacts it before any client — UI, agent, or blob store — ever sees the value.
 * [Runtime sandboxing](https://github.com/nteract/desktop/issues/1307): OS-level process isolation for kernel subprocesses, so untrusted code runs with only the access it needs — project files, packages, and localhost. Opt-in at first, with the long-term goal of sandboxing agent-initiated sessions by default.
 * [Remote runtimes over SSH](https://github.com/nteract/desktop/issues/1334): run kernels on remote machines, tunneled through SSH. No new auth systems, no exposed ports.
-* [Scoped Tauri capabilities](https://github.com/nteract/desktop/issues/908): each window gets only the native permissions it actually needs, not the full set.
+
 
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