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fix(shared): Correct redirect behavior for OAuth applications on /continue
#8391
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
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| @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ | ||
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| '@clerk/shared': patch | ||
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| Fix OAuth application flows to handle redirect to `redirect_url` from `/oauth/authorize/continue` |
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FAPI priority check only validates pathname, not host — risk of matching non-FAPI URLs.
isFAPIInitiatedFlowPath(inurl.ts, lines 427–435) checks onlyparsed.pathnameagainst the allowlist, unlike the siblingisRedirectForFAPIInitiatedFlowwhich also verifiesfrontendApi === url.host. Anyredirect_urlwhose path happens to be/oauth/authorize/continue,/oauth/authorize,/v1/verify,/oauth/end_session, etc. — even on the customer's own origin or another allowed origin — will now overridesignInForceRedirectUrl. This silently breaks the documented force-redirect contract for those paths and, depending on how the returned URL is later consumed, could also be abused as an open-redirect-ish escape from force URLs (the value still passesisAllowedRedirect, but force URL is a stronger configured invariant).Suggest gating on the frontend API host as well, mirroring
isRedirectForFAPIInitiatedFlow:Proposed fix
Also worth adding a unit test covering: (a) a non-FAPI-host URL whose path matches the allowlist should NOT bypass
signInForceRedirectUrl, and (b) a genuine FAPI continuation URL should bypass it.📝 Committable suggestion
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