docs(identity): per-request front-end origin for auth e-mail links

src/content/docs/changelog/index.mdx

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 title: Overview
-lastUpdated: 2026-06-20
+lastUpdated: 2026-07-02
 description: Release notes and version history for fullstackhero.
 sidebar:
   order: 1
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ seo:
 
 Notable changes to the kit, newest first.
 
+## 2026-07-02
+
+- **Identity: password-reset and e-mail-confirmation links now resolve the correct front-end per request.** The reset link was built from a single configured `OriginOptions.OriginUrl` — which points at the API and ships empty in production, so `forgot-password` threw `Origin URL is not configured` — and the confirmation link was built from the request host and pointed straight at the API's `GET /confirm-email` route. Neither could target the right SPA when the kit serves more than one front-end (the admin console and the tenant dashboard on different origins). Link resolution now goes through a dedicated **`FrontendOptions`** (`AllowedOrigins` + `DefaultOrigin`), kept separate from CORS. **Self-service** flows (`forgot-password`, `self-register`) build the link from the request `Origin` header, validated against `FrontendOptions:AllowedOrigins` and returned as the canonical entry — so each user gets a link back to the app they started from; because forgot-password is anonymous a forged/unlisted `Origin` is rejected with **`400`**, and a request with no `Origin` (curl, Scalar, mobile, server-to-server) falls back to `DefaultOrigin`. **Operator-driven** flows (`register`, `resend-confirmation-email`) target `DefaultOrigin` — the recipient's app — so a tenant user provisioned from the admin console gets a link into the tenant app, not the console. The confirmation e-mail now lands on the SPA `/confirm-email` page (which then calls the API) instead of the raw API route. **Action for deployments:** set `FrontendOptions:AllowedOrigins` + `FrontendOptions:DefaultOrigin` — the dev config ships `http://localhost:5173`/`5174` with `DefaultOrigin` the tenant app; both ship empty in production and startup validation now **fails the boot** until you configure them. `CorsOptions:AllowedOrigins` and `OriginOptions:OriginUrl` keep their own roles (browser CORS; the API's public base for avatar URLs). See [#1323](https://github.com/fullstackhero/dotnet-starter-kit/pull/1323).
+
 ## 2026-06-20
 
 - **The `fsh` CLI and `dotnet new` template are now on NuGet as stable `10.0.0`.** The two distribution packages that 10.0.0 had been waiting on have shipped: `FullStackHero.CLI` (install with `dotnet tool install -g FullStackHero.CLI` — no more `--prerelease`) and `FullStackHero.NET.StarterKit` (`dotnet new install FullStackHero.NET.StarterKit`). Because `fsh new` scaffolds *from* that template, the one-command flow is now end-to-end: `dotnet tool install -g FullStackHero.CLI && fsh new MyApp` produces a fully renamed project — unique JWT signing key, generated Docker secrets, `npm install` run, initial commit on `main`. The [Install](/docs/getting-started/install/) and [CLI](/docs/cli/) pages now lead with the CLI as the recommended path; `git clone` and the GitHub template remain available for reading the source or zero-install runs. See the [10.0.0 release](https://github.com/fullstackhero/dotnet-starter-kit/releases/tag/10.0.0).

src/content/docs/modules/identity.mdx

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 title: Identity module
-lastUpdated: 2026-06-11
+lastUpdated: 2026-07-02
 description: JWT bearer + refresh tokens, ASP.NET Identity with roles + permissions, user groups, operator impersonation, two-factor TOTP, sessions, and password-policy enforcement.
 sidebar:
   label: Identity
@@ -149,6 +149,10 @@ endpoints.MapPost("/users", handler)
 
 All 51 endpoints are under `/api/v1/identity/`. The rate-limited `auth` policy covers `POST /token/issue`, `POST /token/refresh`, `GET /confirm-email`, `POST /users/{id}/resend-confirmation-email`, `POST /forgot-password`, `POST /reset-password`, and `POST /self-register`. Full table:
 
+<Callout type="note" title="Where reset & confirmation e-mails point">
+Auth e-mail links resolve through `FrontendOptions` (a dedicated config, separate from CORS). **Self-service** flows (`forgot-password`, `self-register`) link back to the front-end that made the request — the base URL comes from the request `Origin` header, validated against `FrontendOptions:AllowedOrigins` — so with more than one SPA each user gets a link to the app they started from; a forged/unlisted origin is rejected with `400`, and a request with no `Origin` (non-browser callers) falls back to `FrontendOptions:DefaultOrigin`. **Operator-driven** flows (`register`, `resend-confirmation-email`) target `DefaultOrigin` (the recipient's app), so a tenant user provisioned from the admin console gets a link into the tenant app, not the console. The confirmation link lands on the SPA `/confirm-email` page (which then calls `GET /confirm-email`), not the API route directly. Configure `FrontendOptions` for these flows to work — see [CORS & headers](/docs/security/cors-and-headers/).
+</Callout>
+
 | Verb | Route | What it does |
 |---|---|---|
 | POST | `/token/issue` | Login |

src/content/docs/security/cors-and-headers.mdx

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 title: CORS & security headers
-lastUpdated: 2026-06-11
+lastUpdated: 2026-07-02
 description: CORS-before-HTTPS-redirect ordering, the SignalR-credentialed-CORS gotcha, and the production security headers the kit emits by default.
 sidebar:
   label: CORS & headers
@@ -54,6 +54,23 @@ Pipeline order (relevant slice):
 6. ...
 ```
 
+## Front-end origin for auth e-mail links
+
+Links that land on a front-end SPA — the password-reset and e-mail-confirmation e-mails — are **not** built from the CORS list. They resolve through a dedicated `FrontendOptions`, kept separate from CORS on purpose: the CORS allowlist governs which browsers may *call* the API, while this list governs which origins may appear *inside an outbound link*. The two often overlap but carry different duties, and coupling them breaks same-origin / reverse-proxy topologies (SPA + API on one domain need no CORS entries, yet the browser still sends `Origin` on the POST).
+
+```jsonc
+  "FrontendOptions": {
+    "AllowedOrigins": [ "http://localhost:5173", "http://localhost:5174" ],
+    "DefaultOrigin": "http://localhost:5174"   // the tenant SPA
+  }
+```
+
+- **Self-service flows** (`forgot-password`, `self-register`) build the link from the request `Origin` header, validated against `AllowedOrigins` and returned as the canonical list entry — so with more than one SPA each user gets a link back to the app they started from. Because forgot-password is anonymous this is a security boundary: a **forged/unlisted `Origin` is rejected with `400`** rather than turned into a link. A request with **no** `Origin` header (curl, the Scalar try-it UI, mobile, server-to-server) falls back to `DefaultOrigin` instead of failing.
+- **Operator-driven flows** (`register`, `resend-confirmation-email`) target `DefaultOrigin` — the recipient's app — not the calling operator's origin, so a tenant user provisioned from the admin console gets a link into the tenant app, not the console.
+- Matching is component-wise (scheme + host + port, port exact). Startup validation **fails the boot** if neither `AllowedOrigins` nor `DefaultOrigin` is set, so a missing config surfaces loudly instead of 500-ing on the first reset. `appsettings.Production.json` ships both empty — you must configure them (see the [production checklist](/docs/security/production-checklist/)).
+
+(`OriginOptions:OriginUrl` is unrelated: it's the API's own public base for back-end-served assets such as avatar URLs, exposed via `IRequestContext.Origin`.)
+
 ## Why not AllowAnyOrigin for SignalR
 
 CORS spec says: when a response has `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`, the `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` must be an explicit origin, not `*`. SignalR's negotiate request is credentialed (it carries `Cookie` or the JWT via `accessTokenFactory`'s query-param fallback). With `AllowAnyOrigin()`, the server emits `Allow-Origin: *`, which violates the spec — the browser silently refuses to use the response, and SignalR's `HubConnection` fails to start with a confusing CORS error.
@@ -129,7 +146,7 @@ The cookie should be HttpOnly (no JS access — limits XSS impact), Secure (HTTP
 ## Common mistakes
 
 - **Setting `AllowAll = true` in production.** CORS exists to give browsers a sanity check on cross-origin calls. Opening to the world removes the check (it doesn't directly compromise auth — auth still gates the request — but it removes the browser-enforced "is this site allowed to call you?" layer).
-- **Forgetting to fill `AllowedOrigins` in production.** With `AllowAll: false` and no origins, CORS isn't mounted — your React apps on other origins will get blocked by the browser. The symptom is "works in Postman, fails in the browser".
+- **Forgetting to fill `AllowedOrigins` in production.** With `AllowAll: false` and no origins, CORS isn't mounted — your React apps on other origins will get blocked by the browser. The symptom is "works in Postman, fails in the browser". (Auth e-mail links are a *separate* concern now — they use `FrontendOptions`, see above — but that list ships empty in production too, and its startup validation fails the boot until you set it.)
 - **Missing HSTS.** Without HSTS, an attacker on the network can downgrade to HTTP for the first request. The kit emits it on HTTPS responses automatically; verify your proxy doesn't strip it.
 - **CSP that breaks the UI.** If a third-party widget breaks after tightening CSP, look at the browser console — CSP violations are logged. Add the needed origins to `ScriptSources`/`StyleSources`, don't disable the middleware.
 

src/content/docs/security/production-checklist.mdx

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 title: Production security checklist
-lastUpdated: 2026-06-11
+lastUpdated: 2026-07-02
 description: Ten configuration items you must check before shipping fullstackhero to production. Skip none.
 sidebar:
   label: Production checklist
@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ Adjust for your industry. Healthcare (HIPAA) and finance (PCI-DSS) tend to requi
 
 `CorsOptions:AllowAll = true` (and the `SetIsOriginAllowed(_ => true)` policy it enables) is **dev only**. Production needs the explicit lists — and note that `appsettings.Production.json` ships `AllowedOrigins` empty, which means **no CORS middleware mounts at all** until you fill it in; your front-ends on other origins will be blocked by the browser. See [CORS & security headers](/docs/security/cors-and-headers/).
 
+Separately, set **`FrontendOptions`** (`AllowedOrigins` + `DefaultOrigin`) — the allowlist and fallback the Identity module uses to build password-reset and e-mail-confirmation links. It also ships empty in production, and its startup validation **fails the boot** if neither is set, so a missing config surfaces immediately rather than 500-ing on the first reset. `DefaultOrigin` is the tenant SPA; it's the fallback for non-browser callers and the target for operator-driven register/resend links.
+
 ```jsonc
 {
   "CorsOptions": {